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INTRODUCTION 
 
We are currently living a golden age for Tolkien Studies. The field is booming: two 
peer-reviewed journals dedicated to J.R.R. Tolkien alone, at least four journals 
dedicated to the Inklings more generally, innumerable society newsletters and 
bulletins, and new books and edited collections every year. And this only 
encompasses the Tolkien work in English. In the last two decades, specifically since 
2000, the search term “Tolkien” pulls up nearly 1,200 hits on the MLA International 
Bibliography. For comparison, C. S. Lewis places a distant second at fewer than 
900 hits, but even this number outranks the combined hits on Ursula K. Le Guin, 
George R. R. Martin, Robert E. Howard, Terry Pratchett, and Stephen King. During 
this same time frame, the founder of modern horror, H. P. Lovecraft, also garners 
less than one-fifth of Tolkien’s total, which we might consider ironic given the title 
of a recent collection of essays, The Age of Lovecraft (2016). As such, few can 
legitimately deny Tolkien’s cultural and academic centrality. Yet, given this yearly 
wealth of new Tolkien scholarship, it seems natural to ask, “What do Tolkienists 
do when we study Tolkien—and how do we do it?” What techniques and strategies, 
in other words, does the field marshal when attempting to find insightful and 
original things to say? Even more importantly, where is Tolkien Studies going? 
Following a recent clarion call by Helen Young for the field to engage 
critical race theory and other related methods so it might “maintain its legitimacy” 
and avoid “scholarly marginalization and cultural irrelevance” (“Review” 5), 
questions about methodology have assumed ever greater urgency. Yet it might be 
wondered if theory, especially critical theory as a manifestation of critique, remains 
the best—or even most appropriate—tool for addressing the issues raised by 
Young. Over the decades, contemporary theory has been developed to handle 
perspectives and concerns quite orthogonal to Tolkien’s fiction, not to mention epic 
fantasy, so I am offering an alternative, a new approach, that we might call 
“Straussian” or “neo-Straussian” after its German-born inspiration, the political 
philosopher Leo Strauss. Outside the odd fact that they died about six weeks apart, 
little connects Tolkien and Strauss in a biographical sense. Still, several themes 
from Strauss’s voluminous writings can shed light on politically salient aspects of 
Tolkien’s work that other critical methodologies miss or overlook. These Straussian 
themes are the dialectic between ancient and modern; the theologico-political 
dilemma; and thymos, an ancient Greek word translating roughly to “spiritedness.” 
My first section briefly outlines the current field of Tolkien Studies, describing the 
four main ways his work can be studied. The themes borrowed from Strauss form 
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 the core of section II. Afterwards, I sketch what a Straussian approach might look 
like in practice; finally, my fourth section highlights the usefulness of a Straussian 
lens by laying out the tensions that arise when pairing contemporary theory with 
Tolkien—tensions all the more stark, I suggest, given the dominance of Marxist 
cultural theory on fantasy studies since the 1970s. 
 
 
I.   MAJOR APPROACHES WITHIN TOLKIEN STUDIES 
 
The first step in establishing a Straussian lens is to contrast it with other common 
ways of studying Tolkien. We can divide these ways into four broad categories, 
none of them necessarily mutually exclusive: author-centric criticism, the discovery 
of a new object of study, applied critical theory, and devising a new theoretical lens. 
There are no pretensions to completeness here, and I would caution against viewing 
any one category as inherently superior to another. Each can—and has—produced 
valuable scholarship. Still, the goal of any heuristic is to help users grasp a 
phenomenon of incredible scope and variety, so I proffer these categories in that 
spirit. 
 
A. AUTHOR-CENTRIC TOLKIEN CRITICISM 
 
In this category, the principle of authorial intentionality—Tolkien’s own words, 
ideas, statements, texts, and contexts—comprises the prime focal point of criticism 
or scholarship. This umbrella category contains quite a few different method-
ologies: biography, textual editing, source studies, genetic criticism (or analyzing a 
text’s pre-publication history), reception studies, Tolkienian linguistics, an author’s 
own literary theory or practice, studies in immediate historical or cultural context 
affecting authorial intention, etc. Work by Tom Shippey, Verlyn Flieger, and 
Dimitra Fimi all fall into the author-centric camp. Shippey combines literary 
biography with philological analysis, for example, whereas Flieger often combines 
close study of The History of Middle-earth series with using Tolkien’s “On Fairy-
stories” as an interpretative lens. Among the younger generation of Tolkienists, 
Fimi’s Tolkien, Race, and Cultural History comprises an exemplary author-centric 
“case study for comparative research between fiction and biography” (7). And 
source studies as a field remains alive, well, and incredibly prolific. 
 
B. NEW OBJECTS OF STUDY 
 
This category involves selecting some new general object of study (or a field of 
interest) applicable either to a single author or text or across a wide array of them. 
Although authorial intention can matter, it usually assumes a secondary level of 
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 interest. Within 20th-century fantasy, three classic objects of study have been myth, 
folklore, and Jungian archetypes—strong ways, many have felt, to legitimize 
fantasy studies. As recently as 2014, in fact, Brian Attebery argues in Stories about 
Stories that mythopoesis—or how fantasists transform myth—remains a key 
feature of the fantasy genre, which continually redefines the fundamental 
“relationship between contemporary readers and mythic texts” (4). Also relevant to 
this category is the comparative study of themes in fantasy. According to Farah 
Mendlesohn, thematic criticism is a form of “archaeology that excavates the layers 
of a text and compares that text with those found in other excavations” (“Thematic” 
125). Yet scholars also devise new objects of study all the time. Fan studies, for 
example, is growing rapidly, as are ecocriticism and Anthropocene studies. The 
subject of world-building has likewise exploded in popularity, and it has even 
spurred a strong new collection of essays on Tolkien’s own world-building, Sub-
creating Arda, edited by Dimitra Fimi and Thomas Honegger. 
 
C. CRITICAL THEORY 
 
In this context, “theory” means something more specific than the standard trifecta 
of race, class, and gender. As a field, Tolkien Studies already covers these topics 
quite well. Instead, I use “theory” to denote a practice where academic literary 
critics, guided by the ethos and spirit of critique, adopt a social and political role as 
well as a literary one. Although critique’s origins arose during the Enlightenment, 
contemporary theory has absorbed the critical spirit largely through the Frankfurt 
School and post-1968 Parisian thought, and it is no exaggeration to say that critique 
has become the “dominant metalanguage” for literary studies in English 
Departments today, the main method in which graduate students are trained (Felski 
5). The practice subscribes to what Paul Ricoeur has dubbed the “hermeneutics of 
suspicion,” which he attributes to paradigms of thinking first established by Freud, 
Marx, and Nietzsche. According to this critical perspective, all texts are suffused 
with various dominant ideologies or structures of power, the type of power 
depending on the type of theory, but critics should always be wary, always be 
perpetually and suspiciously on guard, in order to call out texts that display 
troubling features. Nouns like interrogate, problematize, and complicate (among 
others) are cornerstones of arguments driven by critique. Complicity is bad; 
subversion is good. Other favorite affective terms include revolutionary as well as 
radical. Overall, critique demystifies, destabilizes, and debunks. It denaturalizes. 
A sure sign of danger is whenever some troublesome X, anything perceived as 
pernicious, has become taken-for-granted or naturalized. In such cases, the critic 
must painfully explicate how X has actually been constructed, since anything 
constructed—unlike anything natural—can be resisted. 
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 Even when individual critical theories disagree vehemently with one 
another, such as in Marxist theory’s well-known clashes with deconstruction and 
feminism, the conventions of critique still unite them. Criticism is political activism 
by other means, and this activism often assumes an aspect of medical diagnostics. 
According to Anker and Felski, a diagnosis implies the “presence of an expert 
(doctor, scientists, technician) who is engaged in the scrutiny of an object in order 
to decode certain defects or flaws that are not readily or automatically apparent to 
a nonspecialist person” (4, emphasis original). At the same time, this continual 
drive for deeper and ever more pervasive forms of critique leads to intense self-
reflexivity. If you do not critique your own assumptions, after all, surely someone 
else will. A striking example of such self-reflexivity in Tolkien Studies comes from 
Jes Battis in Modern Fiction Studies, a major journal of mainstream literary studies. 
When discussing the colonized subjects in The Lord of the Rings, for example, 
Battis argues that “any critical ‘naming’ of Tolkien’s work that [my] analysis may 
arrive at, if such a naming is indeed possible, will be double-voiced, traced with 
echoes, shadows, and split subjects” (911)—a classic deconstructive move by a 
postcolonial theorist who finds any apparently straightforward statement, even his 
own thesis, a source for worry and concern. 
Historically, Tolkien Studies has studiously avoided critique of this kind. 
Writing in 2007, Brian Rosebury observes that critical theory has been “relatively 
unproductive so far as Tolkien is concerned” (654). He makes two exceptions for 
psychoanalytic and feminist theory, but even these exceptions deserve compli-
cation. Psychoanalytic approaches to fantasy have tended more toward Jung than 
Freud, and the extant feminist criticism typically centers on feminist issues rather 
than on feminist critique. In an important bibliographic essay on the topic, for 
instance, Robin Anne Reid defines her feminist inclusions broadly, not according 
to critical methodology but in terms of authors who “primarily focus on Tolkien’s 
female characters” (13). In one way or another, feminist articles on Tolkien are 
generally interested in upholding the literary value of The Lord of the Rings, 
however partially, or defending its author (again however partially) from charges 
of sexism. Properly speaking, though, critique has little interest in an author’s 
personal views. As per critique’s diagnostic function, the “third-person perspective 
of the critic/analyst will always trump the self-understanding of the text/patient” 
(Anker and Felski 5). The author’s explicit goals are just one more layering that 
obscure the text’s political unconscious; at best, an author’s views serve as an index 
to larger cultural ideologies. As a result, Tolkienists have tended to “tread lightly 
when it comes to a more critical approach” on their subject (Hassler-Forest 28), and 
Helen Young echoes this sentiment, noting that works that take a “measured critical 
eye … are published in venues not dedicated to Tolkien scholarship” (“Review” 5, 
emphasis original). Among the few Tolkienists to tackle theory deeply, Gergely 
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 Nagy works in semiotics, and Robin Anne Reid and Jane Chance both employ 
feminist as well as queer theory. 
The question deserves to be asked: why hasn’t theory made a deeper 
impression? Part of the reason, I suspect, is as much personal as historical. Few 
would deny that Tolkienists have a deep abiding love for their subject—but love, 
notably, is an affect notoriously at odds with the hermeneutics of suspicion. At the 
same time, the first few generations of Tolkien scholarship had to fight mainstream 
academia tooth-and-nail for respect, and even if explicit defenses of Tolkien are no 
longer common, the urge to defend Tolkien has never quite gone away. The critical 
spirit, however, is antithetical to defense—and the premises of theory itself, 
furthermore, seem poorly suited to Tolkien. Granted, when Michael D. C. Drout—
probably out of frustration—calls Tolkien’s work “kryptonite for weak literary 
theories” (19), he goes too far. Beyond the undeniable hyperbole, such a statement 
simply avoids theory rather than engaging it directly. Still, I am in greater sympathy 
with his further claim that The Lord of the Rings and Tolkien both “challenge many 
of the comfortable assumptions made by ‘theory’ and its practitioners” (Drout and 
Wynne 122). In other words, just as modernist aesthetics—irony, ambiguity, 
unreliable narration, stream of consciousness—were developed to handle writers 
with literary goals orthogonal to Tolkien’s main literary concerns, so too has 
contemporary theory arisen to handle authors, texts, and situations quite different 
from Tolkien. All theoretical paradigms, after all, privilege some authors at the 
expense of others. Let me suggest, then, that nowhere is this more true than with 
epic fantasy and genre fantasy, the two areas where Tolkien has left his indelible 
mark. For a more in-depth discussion on how theory—including its handmaiden of 
critique—have affected the academic study of fantasy, see section IV. 
 
D. A NEW THEORETICAL LENS 
 
This fourth category views an author or text through a new theoretical lens. Unlike 
critique, which takes neither author nor text at face value, a new lens may or may 
not bear authorial intention some respect. Recently, both Lisa Coutras and Josh 
McIntosh have provided strong examples of new lenses—the former reads Tolkien 
in light of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics, the latter through St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Notably, each project is author-centric, justifying itself through 
how Tolkien might have absorbed formal theology indirectly through his faith. For 
myself, my own approach to Tolkien (whether described as neo-Straussian or 
Straussian) falls into this fourth category as well. Yet for me authorial intention, 
while not inconsequential, assumes a secondary level of interest. The more pressing 
concern from a Straussian viewpoint is the implicit theory of politics in Tolkien’s 
work—which also includes, by extension, the implicit theory of political being 
conveyed by Tolkien into modern epic fantasy literature. 
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 II.   THE STRAUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Today, political science departments feel Strauss’s impact more keenly than other 
disciplines touched by his work: literary studies, classics, rhetoric, hermeneutics. 
Despite Strauss’s contentious reception history, however, a mixture of fierce 
advocacy and haughty academic dismissal, scholars who find Strauss useful 
typically subscribe to a certain set of threshold or methodological commitments. 
According to Zuckert and Zuckert, these commitments are as follows: (a) phil-
osophy is important; (b) political philosophy as an enterprise is a viable one; (c) 
philosophical texts—and, by extension, literary texts—require careful reading and 
exegesis; and (d) the distinction between ancient and modern is a meaningful one, 
although Straussians remain divided on what that meaning ultimately is (67). 
Unfortunately, Strauss himself was a deeply enigmatic thinker. He rarely writes in 
his own voice, and his most suggestive ideas usually appear as commentaries or 
glosses on older thinkers.1 Hence, since Strauss’s exact position on any particular 
commitment is often a matter for heated debate, I sometimes prefer to dub my 
approach neo-Straussian to help distance myself from those debates. Instead, it 
seems better to highlight Straussian themes rather than clear-cut Straussian 
positions—and it is these themes that can motivate new and penetrating questions 
for literary interpretation. 
 
A. ESOTERIC READING AND WRITING 
 
Since Strauss is best known for his thesis on esoteric writing, it cannot avoid being 
mentioned, yet this idea has unfortunately little practical value for studying modern 
literature, epic fantasy, or even Tolkien. Essentially, Strauss argues that the fear of 
persecution has historically led heterodox writers in non-liberal societies to encode 
two types of meaning into their texts: a safe exoteric meaning and a deeper, more 
socially subversive esoteric meaning. Strauss sees esotericism as much more than 
a new interpretative model. Instead, he views it as a genuine discovery, a piece of 
knowledge once lost but now recovered. Soon after making this rediscovery, 
Strauss began to apply esoteric reading to the entire Western philosophical trad-
ition, which had a great impact on his own thought. Intensely averse to Heidegger’s 
and Nietzsche’s versions of historicism, Strauss resisted the notion that the truths 
traditionally sought by philosophy are only “truths,” the mere constructs of history, 
culture, language, or power. Tellingly, this resistance pits Strauss against much 
current critical theory, especially insofar as theory follows the legacy of Heidegger 
                                                        
1 Oddly enough, Strauss’s style of philosophy echoes Tolkien’s style of philology. As Tom Shippey 
explains, Tolkien’s philological writings came “very often in the form of glosses, comments on 
single words, and are not formed into connected arguments; but … that is the way Tolkien’s mind 
worked. Nor is the activity of the glossator to be despised” (iv). 
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 and Nietzsche indirectly through poststructuralist French theory. The esoteric thesis 
on writing, though, opened for Strauss at least the possibility (though never the 
certainty) that genuine transhistorical truths might exist—or, rather, transhistorical 
questions, since Strauss believed all great philosophers write on the same fun-
damental human problems. The transhistorical nature of such questions, in addition, 
creates the possibility that classical philosophy remains relevant to our current 
political age. Modern thought has not simply superseded classical thought. 
Still, whatever the historical merits of esotericism, the esoteric habit of 
reading—if expanded into a general principle of interpretation—commits us to an 
absurdly absolute theory of textual meaning. Allegedly, careless or poor readers 
will read only the surface of a text, picking up the safe and non-subversive 
“exoteric” meaning but missing its deeper truth. Skilled esoteric readers, however, 
will discover the “true,” carefully hidden meaning. Tolkien himself, incidentally, 
strongly equated textual meaning with authorial intent, albeit without Strauss’s 
esoteric trappings. Once, when asked about the graduate work being done on The 
Lord of the Rings, Tolkien responded that he did not care for the practice, not “while 
I am alive anyhow. I do not know why they should research without any reference 
to me; after all, I hold the key” (qtd. in Fimi 7, emphasis added). Sometimes, too, 
weaker versions of Straussian esotericism appear in the secondary literature on 
Tolkien. For example, Fleming Rutledge distinguishes between a surface narrative 
in The Lord of the Rings, addressed to “fainthearted” readers without any “theistic 
faith,” and a deeper theological narrative dedicated to the “self-identified Christian 
believer” (3)—in other words, one reading for the masses, another for a Christian 
elite. Still, as much as esotericism helped Strauss produce many individually 
brilliant readings of philosophical texts, today esotericism, unlike the Straussian 
theme that follows, simply closes off more lines of inquiry than it opens. 
 
B. THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL PROBLEM 
 
This unwieldy phrase comes from Spinoza, and the core problem is simple: does 
the ground of political authority rest on reason—or revelation? Overwhelmingly, 
the post-Enlightenment West has chosen reason, but Strauss attempts to re-
invigorate both sides of this debate. Political philosophers, however, disagree 
vehemently over Strauss’s own position. Some Straussians argue that, since Strauss 
greatly admired Plato and Aristotle, he considered reason as higher. Others find 
evidence that Strauss privileged revelation, and still others—my own camp—think 
that Strauss considered the conflict between reason and revelation a permanent 
problem, at least on the political level. Either way, the theologico-political dilemma 
resonates deeply with a work such as The Lord of the Rings, wherein Tolkien com-
bines his own Catholic faith alongside his philological rigor and respect for the 
natural sciences. The problem therefore offers a theoretical foundation for taking 
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 seriously the theism in Tolkien’s work without also necessarily sharing his piety, 
and it offers a gateway into diverse ways modern readers might engage his texts. 
 
C. THE ANCIENT AND THE MODERN 
 
The most fruitful theme for studying Tolkien, however, and by extension the epic 
fantasy that follows in his footsteps, is arguably the conflict between ancient and 
modern. This conflict echoes the 18th-century Battle of the Books but as applied to 
political theory rather than literature. In short, Strauss sees ancient political 
philosophy, best exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, as dedicated to issues of virtue 
and human excellence. Human beings reach their fullest potential through 
membership in political society. Modern political philosophy, in contrast, 
beginning with Machiavelli and extending through Hobbes, had argued for the 
inadequacy of the ancient project. For Machiavelli, the ancients’ concern with 
virtue had not made practical politics any more successful, and Hobbes, the founder 
of modern liberalism, wished to construct a rigorous political science that, among 
other things, replaced a civil society dominated by aristocrats obsessed with honor 
and glory with a rationalistic middle-class driven by enlightened self-interest. 
Whereas classical political thought emphasized personal virtue, human excellence, 
and the regime, modern political thought since the Renaissance has emphasized 
issues of power and individual rights. It abstracts human beings out of civil society 
by separating society from nature even though ancient political philosophy had 
viewed civil society not only as “natural” but as also the only legitimate ground for 
fulfilling the highest in human potential. In one of Strauss’s most memorable 
phrases, referring specifically to John Locke’s liberalism, the moderns built on the 
“low but solid ground” of selfishness and private greed (Natural 247). From this 
conflict between ancient and modern, too, arises our next Straussian theme. 
 
D. THE PROBLEM OF MODERNITY: OR, THE “CRISIS OF THE WEST” 
 
Over the last few decades, although the academic rhetoric of “crisis” has grown 
wearisome through overuse, this fourth theme indicates why Strauss considers 
reviving the ancient/modern debate so essential for contemporary affairs. As he 
writes in The City and Man, “The crisis of the West consists in the West’s having 
become uncertain of its purpose” (3). The philosophical project of modernity, ac-
cording to Strauss, has grown self-defeating. Through the alliance forged between 
natural science and modern political theory, modernity attempted to emancipate the 
individual as well as political society from the limitations imposed by nature—
limitations once accepted as permanent by classical thought. The Enlightenment’s 
liberal philosophers considered two goals particularly desirable. First, they wished 
to separate humanity from the bonds of religious authority. Second, they sought to 
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 resolve ethical and political problems through mathematical or instrumental 
reasoning. Yet what happened, Straus argues, is that modernity eventually es-
tablished modes of thought fundamentally hostile to reason and to nature, modern 
liberalism’s two main bulwarks. 
The details on how modernity developed this self-defeating character, 
which appear throughout Strauss’s writings but particularly in Natural Right and 
History (1953), stem from the differences Strauss perceives between ancient and 
modern political theory. In general, ancient philosophers took their bearings from 
nature. They understood philosophy as a 
 
quest for the eternal order or for the eternal cause or causes of all things. It 
presupposes then that there is an eternal and unchangeable order within 
which History takes place and which is not in any way affected by History. 
(On Tyranny 212) 
 
Likewise, classical natural right had depended on a “teleological view of the 
universe” where all “natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which 
determines what kind of operation is good for them” (Natural 7). Only through 
reason—understood as substantive reason—can we grasp these ends. As such, 
philosophy becomes an activity of the highest importance. 
Hobbes, though, redefined reason as instrumental only—a mere tool for 
reaching predetermined ends rather than as a determinant of ends. John Locke 
continued this tradition, theorizing modern natural right as non-teleological, a set 
of theorems derived logically from certain premises. He concludes that the genuine 
rational ends for civil society—that is, the best explanation for why anyone would 
ever leave the state of nature—lie neither in acquiring virtue nor in achieving 
human perfection. Instead, they lie in preserving private property—and Thomas 
Jefferson, to list only one example, greatly admired Locke. Yet modernity’s shift 
away from classical natural right, on Strauss’s view, also creates a problem. People 
necessarily must have beliefs, but if nature can never serve as the ultimate ground 
of those beliefs, what does? The modern answer, developed by Nietzsche and 
especially Heidegger, is history, and thus “historicism” becomes Strauss’s 
pejorative term for the “repudiation of the paradigm of a stable nature on behalf of 
the changing philosophical perspectives of human subjectivity” (Rosen 123). 
Unfortunately, if modern liberal democracy is a regime founded on instrumental 
reason and the state of nature, and if late modernity has jettisoned transhistorical 
concepts like reason and nature for History, then the intellectual grounds for our 
attachment to liberal democracy, not to mention natural right, are relatively weak. 
The fate of the Weimar Republic, as believed by Strauss, a German-born Jew who 
left his homeland in 1932, exemplifies the dangers of that weakness. 
9
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 Today, the field of literary studies feels the historicist impact of Heidegger 
and Nietzsche from two main routes: poststructuralist French theory and the 
Frankfurt school. The seeds of Derridean deconstruction, for example, lay in 
Heidegger’s concept of Destruktion, and Foucault has remarked that “my entire 
philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger ... [and] 
Nietzsche” (250).2 The Frankfurt School is relevant here, too, especially Hork-
heimer, who, like Strauss, held strong reservations about instrumental reason’s 
modern ascendency. Yet even though Horkheimer and Strauss were responding to 
the same cultural moment in Germany, they came to radically different conclusions. 
For Horkheimer, rather than suggesting the usefulness of re-evaluating classical 
philosophy, he saw instrumental reason as instead a bourgeois attempt to divorce 
reason from its material sociocultural manifestations. This Marxist critique even-
tually helped bolster two alternative directions in Western thought: an “analytical 
philosophical tradition that continues to appeal to the model of the natural sciences” 
and a second “continental tradition that, in the postmodern aftermath, has increas-
ingly accepted the view that reason is inherently repressive” (Smulewicz-Zucker 
204). Through these twin conduits of Marxist thought and post-1968 French theory, 
critical theory in the humanities now largely embraces this postmodern aftermath, 
although its progressive hopes lie in stark contrast to the right-wing politics for 
which Nietzsche and Heidegger developed their ideas. 
 
 
III.   STRAUSSIAN APPLICATIONS 
 
Leaving aside esoteric reading and writing, then, these final three Straussian themes 
share the most immediate relevance for studying Tolkien. Now, when it first 
occurred to me to pair Strauss with Tolkien, I thought my approach would be 
entirely unprecedented—Strauss, after all, is relatively obscure among English-
department academics, although slightly better known to rhetoricians. Alas, such 
are the perils of doing research. After wading through the secondary literature on 
Tolkien, I discovered not one, not two or even three, but four prior Straussian 
readings of Tolkien. Fortunately for me, although these discoveries are all highly 
suggestive and touch upon important Straussian themes, none truly captures the full 
potential of a Straussian lens. The major reason is probably disciplinary. These four 
articles all come from political scientists, not literary critics, and they apply their 
                                                        
2 Jürgen Habermas, for one, has lain responsibility for the paths taken by Derrida, Deleuze, 
Baudrillard, Foucault, and Lacan at the feet of Nietzsche, and especially Nietzsche’s reading of 
Kant. For Habermas, these figures are the “young conservatives”—they are post-modern in the sense 
of rejecting the “modern” Enlightenment project. Strauss is also mentioned in this same essay, 
whom Habermas calls an old conservative for turning to pre-modern philosophy. Given my own 
admiration for both Habermas and Strauss, however, I would suggest there exists more common 
ground between them than either would perhaps suppose. 
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 Straussianism too rigidly, without sufficient nuance or the required qualifications, 
which leads to several highly questionable arguments. Similarly, their use of the 
secondary literature on Tolkien leaves much to be desired, and this applies equally 
to the only article (Herbert’s) to appear in an academic journal. Oddly enough, too, 
no article mentions Strauss by name. Only through their distinctive Straussian 
phraseology and ideas are these works recognizable as Straussian at all. Yet a quick 
description of these articles, nonetheless, should provide a brief glimpse of what 
applying Strauss can look like. 
From its length, our first example by Joseph V. Brogan appears to have been 
a keynote lecture for a Tolkien panel at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association. This address is the most nakedly Straussian of the 
four. Using esotericism as a starting point, Brogan argues that the “political 
teaching” of The Lord of the Rings is revealed by reading the text as an un-
acknowledged rewriting of Plato’s Republic—or, more specifically, Strauss’s 
unique interpretation of the Republic. Much like Socrates’s Athens, the Shire is an 
“unjust city” (3), a regime both myopic and non-philosophical, and it fails to 
incarnate the highest principles of justice known to us. Brogan also touches upon 
another classic Straussian theme: the conflict between philosophy and the city. 
Philosophers, or at least true philosophers, are always something of an intellectual 
avant-garde, and their philosophizing risks contravening the myths held sacred by 
the city—its religions, traditions, revered stories, ancestral conventions, et cetera. 
Unfortunately, though, Brogan significantly shortchanges Tolkien’s medievalism, 
his Catholicism, and his positive feeling for the Shire. It also seems doubtful that 
Bilbo is a “philosopher” in the strict Straussian sense, which makes applying the 
Straussian conflict between philosopher and city problematic. In a different article, 
Gary B. Herbert echoes Brogan by reading The Lord of the Rings in light of Plato’s 
Republic. Herbert, however, targets the relationship between rhetoric and justice. 
As he says, what renders injustice “invisible is not a magic ring but rather an art or 
craft of some sort” (156). In other words, injustice is a product of rhetoric, or the 
art of using language to obscure the distinction between what is and what seems. 
Amazingly, Herbert fails to draw the obvious parallel to Saruman, the key 
rhetorician in Tolkien’s texts, although Herbert does suggestively connect his idea 
to Tom Bombadil, whose self-sufficiency makes him immune to the disjunction 
between seeming and being. 
The last two Straussian pieces belong to Thomas W. Smith, a theist who 
views Strauss as highly privileging revelation over reason. In “Tolkien’s Catholic 
Imagination,” for example, Smith marshals Tolkien’s piety to view The Lord of the 
Rings as a critique on the limits of modernity (the “crisis of the West” problem). 
For Smith, although Tolkien was modern, he was also a Catholic, one who believed 
that knowledge was mediated through tradition. Modernity and the First World 
War, however, had torn asunder the old view on tradition’s value, and thus Tolkien 
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 uses stories like The Lord of the Rings to “get behind the modern age’s rejection of 
tradition by dramatizing a world in which tradition matters a great deal” (84). 
Perhaps understandably in a short article, Smith never tackles larger questions of 
reason or revelation in Middle-earth; he also shortchanges the modern elements in 
Tolkien. Smith’s other article, “The Folly of the Wise,” attempts to reconcile 
Gandalf’s wisdom with his apparent political foolhardiness, at least according to 
realpolitik. His solution, alas, is sadly allegorical: he sees the entire Quest as a 
metaphor for inner spiritual conflict. Yet he raises other typical Straussian 
concerns—the analysis of political society as theorized by (and after) the 
Enlightenment, the notion of “tragic wisdom,” and the subject of tyranny.3 
However, mechanically asking how Tolkien “fits” a particular Straussian 
theme is less productive than asking what sort of questions those themes can 
generate. For example, Tolkien numbers Gandalf among the Wise, but his peculiar 
status touches upon the theologico-political problem. Whereas Socrates’s wisdom 
lay in proudly professing his own ignorance, Gandalf’s wisdom lies in his 
participation within an implicitly divine cosmic order. Gandalf is more prophet than 
philosopher, and this raises questions larger in scope than the nature of evil or the 
level of paganism in the legendarium. After all, what consequences arise from a 
text that grounds political authority on revelation rather than reason? One, ap-
parently, is a distrust for purely secular efforts to change the world. Noting the 
existence of evils besides Sauron, Gandalf states that “it is not our part to master all 
the tides of the world…. What weather [those who come after us] shall have is not 
ours to rule” (V.9 861). The future as a realm of future projects, the target of radical 
progressive hopes, has arguably been made off-limits by Tolkien. 
Yet, although Marxist critics often accuse The Lord of the Rings and fantasy 
literature of political regressiveness, their core theoretical paradigm seems consti-
tutionally unable to grasp the most politically interesting aspects of Tolkien’s work. 
If The Lord of the Rings helps motivate intuitions on political authority compatible 
with revelation, those intuitions nevertheless now ring strange and alien to modern 
ears. Hence they are ignored, overlooked. But those intuitions never went away, 
not truly—not even within modern secular liberal democracy. Such intuitions, for 
example, although rarely articulated as such, help drive politically powerful coali-
tions in American politics such as American evangelicals. I am not suggesting 
                                                        
3 My research also uncovered two honorable mentions—two articles, though not particularly 
Straussian in their arguments, yet clearly written by political scientists knowledgeable on Strauss’s 
work. The first belongs to Mary M. Keyes, who presented a paper alongside Joseph V. Brogan at 
the same 2003 conference, which she later turned into a book chapter that includes a distinctively 
Straussian phrase: “the concept one’s own” (Keyes 216, emphasis original). Another honorable 
mention comes courtesy of Germaine Paulo Walsh, who writes on the conflict between poetry and 
philosophy, another fundamental theme for Strauss. Although Walsh’s argument does not reflect 
any obvious Straussian influence (nor is he cited), her essay does lean heavily on work by two 
prominent Straussians, Allan Bloom and Stanley Rosen. 
12
Journal of Tolkien Research, Vol. 9 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/journaloftolkienresearch/vol9/iss1/2
 anything so bland—or so false—as that Tolkien directly supports theocratic rule. 
Still, the alterity of his work can defamiliarize several basic assumptions which 
have become so foundational to current ways of thinking that their status as 
assumptions has become hard to see. The radical character of the Enlightenment 
project, for instance its successful attempt to revolutionize politics by founding 
political orders based on reason, has acquired an aura of conservatism in our 
postmodern aftermath. How sound is this view? If we see Tolkien’s world of 
Middle-earth as a legitimate alternative to modernity, a viable social order con-
structed intelligently along non-modern premises, then perhaps not so sound as 
some might think. Regardless of whether or not we share in Tolkien’s perspective, 
though, reading his work can be a profound act of intellectual defamiliarization. 
Yet the implications of this defamiliarization on our habits of thought have never 
been explored. 
For studying Tolkien, though, the Straussian conflict between ancient and 
modern might be even more important. Thanks to epic fantasy’s strong pre-modern 
orientation, the genre seems especially well-suited for thinking “outside” modernity 
in areas other than the ultimate grounds of political authority. Although not all 
fantasists share Tolkien’s historical learning, their invented worlds are resplendent 
nonetheless in new social orders and new political regimes.4 Classical thought had 
viewed the regime, not in legalistic or institutional terms, but through the “aims 
actually pursued by the community or its authoritative part” (Strauss, City 193). A 
regime is ends-oriented; a common or dominant vision of the good unites it. Most 
literary texts employ regimes of one kind or another, and science fiction, especially, 
has a unique talent for creating radically new types of regimes never seen in human 
history. Epic fantasy, though, much like certain kinds of historical fiction, excels at 
portraying historical regimes—models of human political organization molded by 
social and material conditions no longer extant. Epic fantasy thus presents its 
readers with an opportunity to illuminate modernity by imagining what is not 
modern. We understand what is by thinking through what once was. As such, 
something like The Lord of the Rings—this strange mixture of monarchial feeling 
and theological totality—can help us recover the intuitions behind foundational 
concepts of modern political theory—concepts like rights, free speech, equality, 
popular sovereignty, separation of church and state, the nation-state. But because 
we often tend to assume automatically the truth of these things, or understand them 
only in light of contemporary concerns or situations, the intuitions behinds older 
styles of thought, once immensely plausible, have now grown incomprehensible. 
One powerful example is “spiritedness” or thymos, a term nearly absent 
from political theory since the Enlightenment. Conceptually, it is kin to amour-
propre in Rousseau, the desire for glory in Machiavelli, recognition in Hegel, and 
                                                        
4 “Regime” is Strauss’s preferred translation for politeia, the factual arrangement of “human beings 
in regard to political power” (City 136). 
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 the love of fame in Alexander Hamilton, yet it was Plato who first gave thymos 
philosophical expression, linking it to status and esteem, honor and anger. Self-
aggrandizing and highly competitive, thymos is nonetheless a basis for social 
solidarity as well. It creates our deep emotional attachment to what comes “first” 
for people in their communities—the ancestral, the traditional, the what-is-said—
and leads to the feeling, however problematic, that one’s in-group matters more 
than any out-group. In the Republic, Plato considers thymos the special virtue (also 
the vice) of the warrior class, whom he likens to guard dogs, fierce to enemies yet 
unquestionably loyal to friends. The poet Homer, too, treats of thymos. The urge 
for excellence leads Achilles to excel as a warrior, but this same urge also nearly 
ruins the Greeks after Agamemnon angers Achilles with a slight to his prestige. As 
might be imagined, thymos bears a special relation to ancient heroic societies, 
which tend to valorize fame above all else, and thymos recalls—with only slightly 
differing inflection—the chivalrous ofermod of Beorhtnoth and the lofgeornost of 
Beowulf. Because of Tolkien’s immersion in pre-modern literature and history, 
which includes his Christian sensitivity to superbia (in his view a sin), Tolkien’s 
work offers a unique gateway into the modern study of thymotics—a topic, 
incidentally, seeing a recent multidisciplinary resurgence from such scholars as 
Richard Ned Lebow, Francis Fukuyama, and Peter Sloterdijk.5 My own 2016 article 
in The Journal of Tolkien Research, “Harken Not to Wild Beasts,” is an example 
of another such effort for literary studies, seeing Saruman’s own disordered rage, 
his ressentiment, plus his disastrous quest for preeminence, as a reflection of 
modern rage politics. 
 
 
IV.   CRITICAL THEORY AND THE STUDY OF EPIC FANTASY 
 
Yet why Straussianism? Why now? Since any new theoretical lens must establish 
its special usefulness, some might wonder why we should prefer it to critical theory, 
arguably the next major direction for Tolkien Studies. My methodological 
intervention might be viewed, too, as an untimely one. With the rising interest in 
feminist, queer, and critical race approaches for studying Tolkien, the field has 
finally (and thankfully) begun applying the kinds of critical analysis necessary to 
maintain intellectual currency. The work produced by academics like Robin Anne 
Reid and Jane Chance fills a significant gap, and I find it hard to disagree with their 
scholarly goals insofar as we share, I suspect, similar views on social justice. 
Likewise, no one can fault Helen Young for arguing that Tolkienists must critically 
engage those aspects of Tolkien’s legendarium that white supremacist forums find 
                                                        
5 Fukuyama, tellingly enough, studied with Allan Bloom, one of Strauss’s students. Sloterdijk, 
although mainly influenced by Nietzsche, also explicitly credits his own work in thymotics to the 
example set by Fukuyama and Strauss. 
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 praiseworthy (“Review” 5). Still, ’twixt the cup and the lip there is many a slip, and 
it seems an open question whether the tools of critique—its assumptions, premises, 
and basic orientation—fit an author like Tolkien who, in so many ways, seems out 
of step with modernity and postmodernity alike. Is critical theory a solution—or a 
problem? What tensions arise when we pair Tolkien with critical tools developed 
(let us be honest) to engage vastly different authors with vastly different concerns? 
Do they capture the alterity that permeates The Lord of the Rings, and how much 
do we lose compared to what we hope to gain? 
In the following excursion, at most necessarily an outline, I wish to 
articulate my hesitations in applying critical theory as it currently stands by making 
two claims. First, Tolkien is ill-suited to contemporary theory. Second, his work is 
particularly ill-suited to critique as a practice driven by theory. As Sedgwick and 
Frank have observed, theory has become “almost simply coextensive with the claim 
(you can’t say it often enough), it’s not natural” (16, emphasis original). It relies 
overwhelmingly on strong forms of social constructionism and the radical con-
tingency of cultural phenomena. If something has been constructed, it can be re-
constructed. Tolkien, however, is a writer of nature. This claim speaks to the heart 
of his fiction. Even beyond Tolkien’s classist attitudes, his apparent skepticism 
toward secular-left activism, his non-egalitarian views as well as his evident belief 
in cultural growth and decay (shown especially by Gondor), Tolkien is an 
essentialist. He views the cosmic order as intelligible and meaningful. The legacy 
bequeathed to modern fantasy by Tolkien is one of totality in its world-building, 
and although few fantasists share Tolkien’s specific Catholic sensibility, their 
worlds are generally fully intelligible as well. The quest structures that drive these 
fictional narratives are authorized by a stable and coherent cosmic order. That aura 
of meaningful totality helps Tolkien, for example, deny cultural relativism, as when 
Aragorn tells Éomer, “Good and ill have not changed since yesteryear; nor are they 
one thing among Elves and Dwarves and another among Men” (III.2 428). It also 
motivates Tolkien’s aversion to secular messianic hopes. The full realization of 
radical progressive change is mitigated by the Fall; the limitations of human nature 
can never be fully overcome. Nothing can fully replace divine mercy or grace. 
Some Tolkienists, no doubt, will wish to push back against some of these 
characterizations of Tolkien. Their resistance, though, speaks to a significant gap 
between Tolkienists and other fantasy scholars. So many general fantasy scholars—
Colin Manlove, Brian Attebery, Christine Brooke-Rose, Rosemary Jackson—have 
approached Tolkien with great ambivalence, if not outright dislike, and their 
attitudes have infiltrated our most authoritative academic texts for understanding 
epic fantasy. In the Encyclopedia of Fantasy, for example, John Grant argues that 
genre fantasy—which includes post-Tolkien epic fantasy—is essentially not 
“fantasy at all, but a comforting revisitation of cozy venues.” Real or full fantasy, 
in contrast, according to Grant, sparks the reader’s imagination to ever new vistas. 
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 Likewise, Farah Mendlesohn’s ground-breaking Rhetorics of Fantasy classifies 
The Lord of the Rings and its successors as portal-quest fantasies, and her disap-
proval is evident when she states that, unlike science fiction, portal-quest fantasy 
“relies on a moral universe: it is less an argument with the universe than a sermon 
on the way things should be” (5). Finally, Mark Bould and Sheryl Vint in The 
Cambridge Companion to Fantasy Literature observe that the “social order [in 
fantasy] is natural and given rather than historical and contingent” (106). This 
results in negative political consequences since fantasy functions like any “cultural 
text to reproduce dominant ideology—and, for portal-quests, those ideologies are 
usually seen as conservative” (102). 
This aversion to Tolkien’s brand of fantasy partly explains the observable 
gap between Tolkienists and other academic scholars of fantasy. This aversion, 
though, does not occur in a vacuum: it centers around academia’s prevailing 
zeitgeist (fiercely authorized by theory and critique) against nature. In general, these 
fantasy scholars have taken their cues not from mainstream literary studies but from 
SF scholarship. Arguably, this makes sense—fantasy and SF fandoms have 
overlapped throughout their histories. Nonetheless, SF scholars have historically—
and notoriously—viewed fantasy with extreme hostility. Few sibling rivalries have 
been so bitter. Fantasy literature has endured such various descriptions as immature, 
reactionary, regressive, conservative, nostalgic, anti-political, and anti-historical. 
In championing SF as a genre that exemplifies rationality and cognitive estrange-
ment, for example, Darko Suvin labels fantasy an anti-cognitive “subliterature of 
mystification” (8–9). Fredric Jameson, for his part, has spent the better part of four 
decades denigrating fantasy, arguing that the “absence of any sense of history … 
most sharply differentiates fantasy from Science Fiction” (Archaeologies 61). 
According to this view, fantasy naturalizes a world in drastic need of revolutionary 
change. Under a sweeping ontology of Good and Evil, historical contradictions 
simply disappear, and the fantasy genre remains lamentably “wedded to nature and 
to the organism” at a time when, finally, technology has raised posthuman and 
transhuman possibilities (Jameson 64). Under this view, fantasy’s twin recourses 
to magic and essentialism dooms it, alas, to intellectual irrelevance and political 
impotence. 
Nor are these opinions the reactionary avowals of scholars devoted to 
literary realism. No less than fantasy, SF belongs to fantastika and romance. Still, 
when the formal academic study of SF began developing back in the 1970s, its 
dominant paradigm was one of the original hermeneutics of suspicion: Marxism. 
Most of the early figures associated with Science Fiction Studies, for example, 
including Suvin, Jameson, Carl Freedman, and Tom Moylan, were all Marxist 
critics; and, rather than promoting an orthodox Marxism that emphasized partisan 
literature, as did Lenin and Sartre, these SF critics drew their main inspiration from 
the critical tradition established by the Frankfurt School (Burns 269). And Marxist 
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 claims to primacy in SF continue to this day. As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay writes, the 
“most sophisticated studies of sf have been either explicitly Marxist in orientation 
or influenced by Marxist concepts adopted by feminism, race-criticism, queer 
theory and cultural studies” (113)—a remarkable imperialistic assertion, though 
still largely true. The allegorical method of Fredric Jameson has also been highly 
influential in spreading the hermeneutics of suspicion. For Jameson, the depths of 
the text—its political unconscious—must always be plumbed, and critics must 
restore to the “surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this 
fundamental history [of class struggle]” (Political 20). Texts never just mean only 
what they purport to mean because, after all, if “everything were transparent, then 
no ideology would be possible, and no domination either” (61). Criticism therefore 
becomes a matter of questioning, interrogating, unmasking, debunking. Jamesonian 
Marxists take nothing at face value, “nature” least of all, since claims appealing to 
nature are claims that deny the power of history. Under this model of thought, 
needless to say, SF comes off rather well—less so fantasy. Yet these essential 
Marxist distinctions have profoundly affected the development of academic fantasy 
criticism.6 
Unsurprisingly, when Marxist critics have trained their sights on Tolkien, 
the results have been brutal.7 By and large, however, except for Tolkienists, fantasy 
scholars have mostly adopted—with varying degrees of explicitness—a Marxist 
perspective. According to James Gifford in his exhaustive, landmark A Modernist 
Fantasy, the “focus of critical studies of fantasy after the 1970s has been materialist 
and dialectical in nature, predominantly through Jameson, and perhaps most 
especially so when its critical method is not explicit” (29). Despite this light thrown 
on Marxist approaches to fantasy, though, Gifford’s support of radical anarchist 
theory means that he is as dismissive of Tolkien and his legacy as the Marxists. The 
fantasists whom Gifford champions are all libertarians and fellow anarchists: 
Mervyn Peake, Henry Treece, John Cowper Powys, Ursula K. Le Guin, Samuel R. 
Delany, Poul Anderson. Tolkien and the Inklings remain responsible for the fantasy 
genre’s “reactionary class consciousness and hegemonic operations of race and 
                                                        
6 One organization example: the IAFA partly owes its existence to the SFRA’s refusal, back during 
the 1980s, to add “fantasy” as a word describing what their organization researches. 
7 One unusually temperate Marxist reading of The Lord of the Rings comes from Stephen Kelly, but 
even this mild account contains all the major features of critique and the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
For Kelly, since “ideology is typically hidden from both author and reader,” the critic must delve 
deeply into the text and discover how “Tolkien’s economic world-building process reproduces 
certain aspects of capitalistic economic structures [i.e. capitalist ideology]” (114). Since the verdict 
given on any text is never “innocent,” however, a deeper look unsurprisingly reveals that Tolkien, 
despite the pre-modern character of Middle-earth, reproduces the “economic unawareness endemic 
in modern society” (128). 
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 gender” (Gifford 70).8 Other recent theory-driven approaches to fantasy studies 
likewise partake of the critical attitude—its determination to unmask, to debunk, to 
denaturalize. Critical race theorists Helen Young and Mark C. Jerng, for example, 
each find popular fantasy deeply problematic. For Young, constructions of 
“whiteness” lie at the core of popular fantasy, and she attaches particular blame to 
Tolkien and Robert E. Howard, whose writings have mutually served to “channel 
centuries-old constructs into contemporary popular culture” (17). Jerng targets 
Howard as well for introducing a legacy of “racial world-building” into sword-and-
sorcery fiction. 
Under such models, Tolkien and his legacy to epic fantasy have become the 
preferred whipping boys against which “good” fantasy is defined—much like how, 
a generation earlier, SF critics had used fantasy to elevate their preferred genre. At 
this point, it might be worthwhile to mention Samuel R. Delany, the fantasist most 
often praised by critical paradigms, whose Nevèrÿon tetralogy appeared from 1979 
through 1987. Delany earns high marks from James Gifford as well as Mark C. 
Jerng, who sees Delany as a healthier alternative to Howard. Another person who 
praises Delany highly (and at Tolkien’s expense) is Marxist critic Carl Freedman. 
Like Darko Suvin, Freedman disparages fantasy as non-cognitive, and he considers 
Tolkien someone whose “prodigious invention and awesome architectonic skill” 
hides his “intellectual impoverishment” (264). But Delany is Freedman’s exception 
that proves the rule. Delany is a deconstructionist and a Marxist both, and his fiction 
reflects that poststructuralist orientation. There is nothing “natural” in Delany. 
Everything is a construct, a product of history, and his fantasy lives and breathes 
the critical ethos. Tolkien, however, is sadly non-critical in comparison (or so the 
thinking might continue). He is the genre’s doddering old grandfather, influential 
yet “problematic,” a figure with embarrassingly outdated opinions on nature, 
history, meaning, language, class, and metaphysics. Perhaps Tolkien’s longevity 
and popularity deserve some formal respect, but “serious” critics need not take him 
seriously.9 
                                                        
8 Gifford seems unaware of Letter 52 where Tolkien states his preference for “Anarchy 
(philosophically understood, meaning abolition of control not whiskered men with bombs)” (63), 
although I suspect this revelation would grant Tolkien little positive standing in Gifford’s judgment. 
As with John Grant and others, Tolkien’s brand of epic fantasy serves as too useful a foil for the 
fantasy Gifford prefers. 
9 Lest anyone suspect me of exaggeration, let me turn once again more specifically to Freedman, 
who, driven by his academic faith in Marxist critique, blasts Tolkien Studies as a field for its hordes 
of “weak-minded sub-Tolkienian ephebes to whom evasion of stubborn historical difficulty and 
complexity is immediately congenial” (264). Who is the lone example cited by Freedman? Tom 
Shippey, of all people (264, n. 6). Yet we cannot simply dismiss Freedman as a crank. He is a scholar 
with a long history of significant contributions to SF scholarship. If we are to illuminate the virtues 
Tolkien’s work, the field must go beyond nitpicking Freedman’s misunderstandings and tackle the 
deeper theoretical paradigms that authorize those misunderstandings in the first place. 
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 Intuiting some of these issues, a few of the more theory-savvy Tolkienists 
have chosen to fight fire with fire—and, in the process, indirectly demonstrate the 
problems caused by pairing Tolkien with critical theory. When confronted by a 
cherished yet problematic text, observes Rita Felski, critics wedded to critique are 
often forced to “tie themselves into knots in order to prove that a text harbors signs 
of dissonance and dissent—as if there were no other conceivable way of justifying 
its merits” (17). Something of the same happens to Jane Chance in Tolkien, Self, 
and Other. Although Chance, perhaps more than any other Tolkienist, has 
pioneered queer, feminist, and postcolonial strategies for studying Tolkien’s 
fiction, two seemingly incompatible goals complicate her book’s achievement. 
First, Chance seeks to defend Tolkien personally (and by extension his texts) from 
detractors, since Tolkien, she claims, is “much more forward-thinking than has 
previously been considered” (xi). Second, Chance also wishes to frame her defense 
through queer theory, which emphasizes marginalization and difference. On a 
rhetorical level, this framework cleverly positions Tolkien—a writer too often seen 
as reactionary—within a progressive theoretical discourse highly esteemed by 
current academic critics. Based on intentions alone, Tolkien, Self, and Other is an 
ambitious and remarkable book, and the field of Tolkien Studies is stronger for it. 
Still, the first tension between Chance’s two goals, personal defense through 
employing queer theory, lies in her overly pious biographical approach to Tolkien. 
Overall, critical theorists tend to discount authorial intention. Even if we ignore 
Barthes’s “death of the author” thesis, which some theories of textual meaning 
require, the critic is still supposedly a clinician, someone who diagnoses a text’s 
ills with expert knowledge unavailable to the text’s hapless author—in fact, much 
like a psychologist overseeing treatment for an inadequately self-aware patient. 
This is why critique so often leads to arguments with the following structure: 
“Although the text or the author purports to do X, it is actually (and often 
inadvertently) doing the opposite of X.” As a member of Tolkien’s academic 
comitatus, however, Chance simply turns a blind eye to this tripping point. She 
avoids critique and concentrates only on defense. Actually, Chance’s biographical 
treatment does try to form a bridge between her two goals. Because of Tolkien’s 
experiences as someone “queer,” a person from the margins—a medievalist, an 
orphan, born in South Africa, a religious minority in Protestant England—Tolkien 
had acquired great “sympathy for and toleration of those who are different, un-
important, or marginalized,” including “medieval and modern women” (Chance xi, 
180). Thus do biography and queer theory come together, albeit somewhat uneasily. 
Yet a second tension arises through how Chance must abandon critique’s intense 
self-reflexivity. Otherwise, this requirement might have forced Chance to confront 
the many non-queer aspects to Tolkien’s biography: his education and class, his 
status as a white cisgender Christian male, his Oxford professorship. These, too, 
are part of The Lord of the Rings—and Tolkien’s detractors, whether Marxist or 
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 not, have harped upon them for decades. But Chance, despite using the terminology 
of theory, refuses to embrace its tell-tale suspicion. She rebuts weaker individual 
criticisms against Tolkien while studiously avoiding the deeper challenges critical 
theory was designed to produce—the more totalizing critique of ideology. As a 
result, Tolkien, Self, and Other is defending Tolkien from an anti-Tolkienism light. 
Even more problematically, Chance never interrogates what it means to 
apply something like queer theory to Tolkien or his work. Early in the book, Chance 
enthusiastically cites Wendy Moffat, a queer biographer who states that queer 
theory began, not “just as a totalizing vision—but rather as a totally anti-essentialist 
one. The goal was to illustrate how constructed, how unnatural essentialist assump-
tions about identity were” (qtd. in 5, emphases added). Unfortunately, Tolkien is 
an essentialist. He does believe in nature, arguably never raises identity as an issue, 
and he furthermore creates a theologically tinted secondary world—mythically 
ordered and fully intelligible—replete with semantic certainties and cosmic givens. 
In truth, Tolkien, Self, and Other is probably best considered a translation. Here is 
queer theory, there is Tolkien; let us read the latter according to the former. Yet 
something is always lost in a translation. What vanishes under Chance? Tolkien’s 
religion, for one thing—an astounding exclusion for such a biographical book. But, 
as Marxists have long recognized, the Inklings’ understanding of good and evil is 
simply impossible under critical theory. The language of sin and guilt, salvation 
and redemption, grounds its meaning in a universe centered by divine authority, 
God’s or Ilúvatar’s, but any critical paradigm—anti-foundationalist to their core—
must reject such thinking. The revelation of morals recedes before a genealogy of 
morals. Yet these terminological shifts, their implications, do not concern Chance. 
She confidently reinterprets the failures of pride and honor in The Lord of the Rings 
as failures of “masculinity” (chapter 8), but they are far from the same thing. 
Likewise, although queer theory shares Tolkien’s undeniable concern for the mar-
ginalized, Tolkien would have found intellectual and emotional authorization for 
his empathy, not via strong social constructionism, but from the Sermon on the 
Mount. The language of the meek, the humble, the poor, the long-suffering: this is 
what suffuses The Lord of the Rings, yet this language requires assumptions about 
the world that are undermined—consciously and deliberately—by the theory 
paradigm promoted by Chance. 
From these remarks, do not suppose that I specifically endorse or accept 
Tolkien’s worldview—far from it, actually. Still, it seems telling that Chance feels 
compelled to translate that worldview out of existence in Tolkien, Self, and Other. 
In a book about alterity, we are ironically told that Tolkien is just like us; his 
otherness is really sameness. He is forward-thinking, just like us, and his fiction, 
truly and honestly, supports our most progressive concepts from modern theory. At 
least critic Dirk Wiemann takes Tolkien’s alterity more seriously. For him, we 
cannot simply play ostrich with the “rigid binarisms” at the center of The Lord of 
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 the Rings—a sin he attributes to the various “well-meant misreadings” proposed by 
“queer, feminist or otherwise politically informed readings of Tolkien” (195). 
Wiemann’s solution, though, continues to double-down on theory: he purposely 
misreads Tolkien’s essentialism as a form of strategic essentialism. As I have been 
suggesting, however, this type of strategy is a mistake. It is an opportunity lost. 
Perhaps, when reading authors whose main ideas diverge sharply from my own, I 
treat their differing worldviews too sanguinely. Still, the strangeness and alterity of 
The Lord of the Rings strikes me as its deepest intellectual attraction. By presenting 
us with the non-modern, or only partially modern, Tolkien can lead readers into re-
examining our basic assumptions. This is why a neo-Straussian approach seems so 
especially useful. As a political philosopher, Strauss has a keen sensitivity for what 
modernity typically takes for granted, and his interest in the political links him to 
similar interests by modern academics. Overall, though, much like the editors of a 
recent anthology on postcritique, I am less concerned with hammering home “a 
‘critique of critique’ than with testing out new possibilities and intellectual alter-
natives” (Anker and Felski 2). Although Strauss’s work offers one such alternative, 
others can surely be imagined. In any event, new modes of theorizing—new sets of 
concepts—seem necessary if the study of Tolkien, which includes the epic fantasy 
tradition founded by Tolkien, is to keep pace with mainstream genre and literary 
studies. 
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